

The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors¹

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In two separate experiments subjects read a standardized description of a crime of negligent automobile homicide. In both Experiments I and II, the victim of the crime was presented to approximately one-half of the subjects as an unattractive person (Unattractive Victim condition) and to the other half of the subjects as an attractive person (Attractive Victim condition). In Experiment II the character of the defendant was also varied: he was described to some subjects as an attractive person, to some as an unattractive person, and to others as a "neutral" person. The actual circumstances of the crime were, of course, identical for all subjects. The subjects were requested to sentence the defendant to a specific number of years of imprisonment according to their own personal judgment.

As predicted, the results of both Experiments I and II showed that subjects in the Attractive Victim conditions tended to sentence the defendant to a greater number of years of imprisonment than subjects in the Unattractive Victim conditions. In Experiment II, subjects in the Unattractive Defendant condition sentenced the defendant more severely than subjects in either the Attractive or Neutral Defendant conditions.

Several writers have commented on the irrational tendency of people to exaggerate a person's causal responsibility for an event while underestimating the role of other causal factors which are logically involved in the occurrence of that event (Heider, 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965). This tendency to perceive persons as causal origins often influences the manner in which we evaluate or judge other individuals. That is, we

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often judge a person in terms of the consequences or effects of which we perceive him to be the causal origin. This occurs even in situations where there are many factors beyond the person's control which, from a logical point of view, are responsible for the specific effects.

For example, an experiment by Walster (1966) demonstrated that the more serious the consequences of an accident, the greater was the tendency for subjects to assign responsibility for the accident to someone who could *possibly* be held responsible for it. In Walster's experiment subjects heard a tape-recorded description of an accident in which a car owner parked his uninsured car at the top of a hill. The hand brake cable of the car broke and the car started to roll down the hill. For some of the subjects the damage caused by the car was described as having been minimal—the car was stopped by a tree stump and was slightly dented. For other subjects the damage was described as having been serious—the car rolled all the way down the hill, crashing through the window of a store and injuring two people. The subjects did not perceive the car owner as being more careless when the consequences of the accident were serious. They did, however, apply more strict moral standards in assessing his behavior, feeling that he was under greater moral obligation to have had auto insurance and to have had his brakes checked more frequently when the consequences of the accident were severe than when they were mild.

The fact that greater responsibility was attributed to the car owner when the effects of the accident were serious raises an interesting question concerning the judgment and punishment of criminal behavior. It is likely that people somehow view a crime as being more serious if the victim of the crime is a good, attractive person. If this is the case, one might ask whether individuals have a tendency to judge a criminal defendant more harshly when the *victim* of the crime is an attractive individual than when the victim is an unattractive individual. While "the law" makes no such distinction (i.e., a criminal is not held to be more responsible, guilty, or deserving of punishment the more sympathetic and attractive his victim), it is quite possible that the decision of a jury will be affected by the character of the victim in a criminal case.

This possibility apparently has not escaped the attention of criminals' counsel. Percy Foreman, a noted criminal defense lawyer, has claimed that "The best defense in a murder case is the fact that the deceased should have been killed regardless of how it happened" (Smith, 1966). In one case in which Foreman represented a woman who had confessed to shooting her husband, Foreman so effectively villified the victim that he felt "The jury was ready to dig up the deceased and shoot him all over again" (Smith, 1966). The jury did acquit his client.

The present research deals with the relationship between the personal characteristics of the victim of a crime and the desire or tendency of individuals to punish the person accused of committing that crime. In Experiment I the personal characteristics of the victim of a criminal offense are varied. We have predicted that when the victim of a criminal offense is presented as having positive characteristics, subjects will be more severe in their "sentencing" of the defendant than when the victim of the identical offense is presented as having negative characteristics.

While the present research is not directly concerned with the law or legal system *per se*, it does have obvious implications for both. The juridical analog seems to provide the most logical means of testing our hypothesis. For obvious reasons, however, we were unable to utilize real juries in actual criminal trials. The investigator of legal processes and judicial decision is confronted with numerous social, economic, and methodological difficulties (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Zeisel, 1962; Strodtbeck, 1962; James and Strodtbeck, 1957; Redmount, 1961). An attempt to manipulate variables within the context of an actual trial would be impossible. In addition, since there are a multiplicity of factors entering into a determination of guilt, we wanted to employ a situation in which there was little or no doubt in the minds of our subjects about the guilt of the defendant, i.e., a situation in which it would be clear that he had actually perpetrated the offense. We could then ask our subjects to sentence the defendant to what they felt was an appropriate number of years of imprisonment. This would provide us with a continuous variable, indicating severity of punishment, for our major dependent variable. Furthermore, we wanted to be able to control the circumstances of the crime so that it would not only be identical for all subjects but also be completely independent of the characteristics of the victim.

EXPERIMENT I

Method

Subjects were 261 male and female sophomores at the University of Texas who had agreed to participate in a study dealing with "Juridical Judgment" in order to fulfill a requirement in their introductory psychology course. Twelve experimental sessions were scheduled on 4 consecutive days with from 20 to 30 subjects participating in each session.

The experimental sessions were all held in a university classroom. At the start of each session the experimenter greeted the subjects and then made the following comments:

"We are interested in studying the manner in which people judge various criminal offenses. I am going to give each of you a booklet which contains a brief account of a criminal offense. When you have finished reading the case account, you will be asked to give your personal opinion concerning the case.

That is, we want you to sentence the defendant described in the case account to a specific number of years of imprisonment. Take as much time as you want in reading and contemplating the case before you finally sentence the defendant. Remember that we are interested in your personal opinion, so please give your own personal judgment and not how you feel others might react to the case or how you feel you should react to it. One other thing—in making your sentence, consider the question of parole as being beyond your jurisdiction. That is, sentence the defendant irrespective of whether or not you feel he should have opportunity for parole after a certain number of years in prison.”

The experimenter then passed out copies of a case account of a negligent automobile homicide. These were identical for all subjects except in one respect: In approximately one-half of the case accounts the victim of the negligent homicide was presented as an unattractive individual, while in the other half of the case accounts the victim was presented as an attractive individual. The assignment of subjects to either the Attractive or Unattractive Victim condition was, of course, random. There were 129 subjects in the Attractive Victim condition and 132 subjects in the Unattractive Victim condition.

The description of the crime as presented in the case account is presented below:

“John Sander was driving home from an annual Christmas office party on the evening of December 24 when his automobile struck and killed a pedestrian by the name of Martin Lowe. The circumstances leading to this event were as follows: The employees of the insurance office where Sander worked began to party at around 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the 24th. By 5:00 p.m. some people were already leaving for home, although many continued to drink and socialize. Sander, who by this time had had several drinks, was offered a lift home by a friend who did not drink and who suggested that Sander leave his car at the office and pick it up when he was in ‘better shape.’ Sander declined the offer, claiming he was ‘stone sober’ and would manage fine. By the time Sander had finished another drink, the party was beginning to break up. Sander left the office building and walked to the garage where he had parked his car, a four-door 1965 Chevrolet. It had just started to snow. He wished the garage attendant a Merry Christmas and pulled out into the street. Traffic was very heavy at the time. Sander was six blocks from the garage when he was stopped by a policeman for reckless driving. It was quite apparent to the officer that Sander had been drinking, but rather than give him a ticket on Christmas Eve, he said that he would let Sander off if he would promise to leave his car and take a taxi. Sander agreed. The officer hailed a taxi and Sander got into it. The minute the taxi had turned a corner, however, Sander told the driver to pull over to the curb and let him out. Sander paid the driver and started back to where he had parked his own car. Upon reaching his car he proceeded to start it up and drove off. He had driven four blocks from the street where the police officer had stopped him when he ran a red light and struck Lowe, who was crossing the street. Sander immediately stopped the car. Lowe died a few minutes later on the way to the hospital. It was later ascertained that internal hemorrhaging was the cause of death. Sander was apprehended and charged with negligent homicide. The police medical examiner’s report indicated that Sander’s estimated blood alcohol concentration was between 2.5 and 3.0% at the time of the accident.”

Manipulation of the Description of the Victim

The next paragraph in the case account contained a description of the victim, which differed for subjects in each of the two experimental conditions.

Attractive victim. “The victim, 48-year-old Martin Lowe, was a senior partner of a successful stock brokerage firm and an active member of the community welfare board. He was a widower and is survived by his son and daughter-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Lowe. At the time of the accident the victim was on his way to the Lincoln Orphanage, of which he was a founding member, with Christmas gifts.”

Unattractive victim. “The victim, 48-year-old Martin Lowe, was a notorious hoodlum and ex-convict who had been convicted of assault and extortion. He was a henchman for a crime syndicate which had been under police investigation for some time. A loaded 32-caliber pistol was found on his body.”

The final paragraph of the case account contained a description of the defendant, which was the same for all subjects. The defendant was described as a 37-year-old insurance adjuster and divorcee. While he had no previous criminal record, he did have several serious violations on his traffic record.

The last page of the case account booklet contained instructions to the subjects to judge and sentence the defendant. In these, the subjects were requested to consider the crime as being punishable for from 1 to 60 years of imprisonment, and to sentence the defendant to a specific number of years of imprisonment according to their own personal judgment. They were told to take as much time as they wanted in making their decision.

When all of the subjects had completed sentencing the defendant, the experimenter collected the booklets. He then explained the nature of the experiment to the subjects.

Results

Each subject sentenced the defendant in the automobile homicide case to a specific number of years of imprisonment. We predicted that those subjects to whom the victim of the crime had been described as possessing positive characteristics would sentence the defendant to a greater number of years of imprisonment than those subjects to whom the victim had been presented as possessing negative characteristics. The results of the study lend support to this prediction. The mean sentence of subjects in the Attractive Victim condition was 15.77 years, while the mean sentence of subjects in the Unattractive Victim condition was 12.90 years. However, this difference did not reach the conventional level of significance ($F = 3.18$, 1 and 257 *df*, $p < .08$). This F ratio is the result of a two-way analysis of variance in which the nature of the victim was one factor and sex was the other factor. As expected, there were no systematic effects due to sex. The main effect for sex yielded $F = 1.05$ (1 and 257 *df*, $p < .31$). The interaction yielded $F < 1$.

EXPERIMENT II

Because of the marginal nature of the above results, we repeated the experiment with some slight modifications designed to make the manipulation more powerful. In addition, we manipulated the character of the defendant in order to assess the effect of this variable on the judgment of the subjects.

It is a common belief that jurors in a criminal trial are often influenced by the personal characteristics of the *defendant*. That is, they have a tendency to be more lenient in their decision when the defendant possesses certain positive characteristics and more severe when he possesses certain negative characteristics, even when these are apparently unrelated to the offense or circumstances in which it took place.

There is, in fact, some empirical evidence which indicates that sentiments about the defendant—his court appearance, family, occupation, etc.—may actually influence the decision of a jury. In a large-scale study of the decisions of judges and juries, Kalven and Zeisal (1966) asked judges to report by mail questionnaire on criminal cases which were tried before them with juries. The judges reported the actual verdict handed down by the jury, what their own verdict would have been had the case been tried before them without a jury, and the reasons which they thought accounted for disagreements when the two verdicts differed. In a sample of 962 cases in which the judge and jury disagreed about the verdict, the judges attributed 11% of the disagreements to factors related to the impression created by the defendant. In another sample of 293 disagreement cases in which judges were asked to indicate on the questionnaire whether they felt the impression made by the defendant was sympathetic, average, or unattractive, 14% of the disagreements were attributed to sentiments about the defendant.

These results seem to indicate that an attractive defendant can move the jury to be more lenient than the judge would have been, i.e., acquit rather than convict. Conversely, an unattractive defendant can presumably move the jury to be more severe than the judge would have been, i.e., convict rather than acquit. Still, the investigators note that the defendant factor rarely accounted for judge-jury disagreements in and of itself, but rather, acted in conjunction with other variables such as (a) disparity in the quality of the prosecution and defense counsel and (b) the ambiguity of the evidence presented during the trial. There is, of course, no information presented with regard to the extent which the judge himself is motivated in his decision by feelings about the defendant. However, the assumption is that the judge is less influenced than the jury by such sentiments. His primary concern is with the law and he is probably less swayed than the jury by extra-legal factors.²

In Experiment II the characteristics of both the defendant and the victim are varied. We have predicted that the more unattractive the presentation of the defendant, the more severe will be the sentence he receives. The prediction concerning the relationship between severity of sentence and the nature of the victim

² Extra-legal factors often do affect judges' decisions. Evidence of this was found in the considerable individual differences between judges with regard to the severity of sentences (number of penal sentences passed) which they impose on convicted criminals for the same type of offense, in the same criminal court (time and locale constant). Experience does not appear to be an important factor in accounting for these inter-judge differences. Judges come onto the bench with the same individual tendencies which they maintain even over a ten-year period (see Guadet, 1938).

is, of course, the same as that in Experiment I—the more attractive the victim, the more severe the sentence.

Method

Subjects were 116 male and female students in two sections of an introductory government course at the University of Texas. The regular class instructor—the same individual for both sections—served as the experimenter.³ The experimental sessions took place during regular class meetings and the subjects were not given any indication that they were participating in an experiment.

The basic case account of the automobile homicide offense presented to the subjects was nearly identical to that presented in Experiment I. In the present experiment, however, both the nature of the defendant and the nature of the victim were systematically varied in a 2 × 3 design with two levels of victim character: Attractive and unattractive; and three levels of defendant character: Attractive, unattractive, and neutral. In addition, the descriptions of the defendant and victim were interpolated throughout the case account instead of appearing complete at the end of the account. This was done in order to make the personal characteristics of the defendant and victim salient throughout the description of the crime. It was also felt that this was a more subtle way of providing the subjects with the information about the principals involved in the case.

At the start of each of the two experimental class sessions, the instructor informed the students that he was going to give each of them a booklet containing a brief account of a criminal offense. He continued with instructions and remarks similar to those employed by the experimenter in the first study. When he completed these introductory comments, the instructor passed out the copies of the case account, randomly assigning each student to one of the six experimental conditions. There were 21 subjects in the Neutral Defendant-Attractive Victim condition, 23 subjects in the Neutral Defendant-Unattractive Victim condition, and 18 subjects in each of the remaining four conditions (Attractive Defendant-Attractive Victim; Unattractive Defendant-Attractive Victim; Attractive Defendant-Unattractive Victim; Unattractive Defendant-Unattractive Victim).

Below are the aggregate descriptions of the defendant and the victim. Again, the subjects were not presented with them in this fashion, but with each sentence or descriptive phrase inserted at the appropriate place in the case account, depending on the condition to which the subject had been assigned. The descriptions were based, in part, on the comments made by the judges in Kalven and Zeisal's (1966) study concerning the characteristics of individual defendants which appeared to influence jury sentiments.

Attractive victim. "Lowe is a noted architect and prominent member of the community. He had designed many well-known buildings throughout the state . . . was an active member of the community welfare board. At the time of the incident, Lowe was on his way to the Lincoln Orphanage, of which he was a founding member, with Christmas gifts. He is survived by his wife and two children, ages 11 and 15."

Unattractive victim. "Lowe is a notorious gangster and syndicate boss who had been vying for power in the syndicate controlling the state's underworld activities. He was best known for his alleged responsibility in the Riverview

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massacre of five men. At the time of the incident, Lowe was carrying a loaded 32-caliber pistol which was found on his body. He had been out of jail on bond, awaiting trial on a double indictment of mail fraud and income tax evasion."

Attractive defendant. "Sander is a sixty-four-year-old insurance adjuster who has been employed by the same insurance firm for 42 years. Sander is friendly with everyone and was known as a good worker. Sander is a widower, his wife having died of cancer the previous year, and he is, consequently, spending Christmas Eve with his son and daughter-in-law. When the incident occurred, Sander's leg banged the steering column, reagravating a gun wound which had been the source of a slight limp and much pain. Sander's traffic record shows he has received three tickets in the past five years, two of which were moving violations."

Unattractive defendant. "Sander is a thirty-three-year-old janitor. In the building where Sander has been working as a janitor for the past two months, he was not known by many of the firm employees, but was nevertheless invited to join the party. Sander is a two-time divorcee, with three children by his first wife, who has since remarried. He was going to spend Christmas Eve with his girlfriend in her apartment. The effect of the incident on Sander was negligible; he was slightly shaken up by the impact, but suffered no major injuries. Sander has two misdemeanors on his criminal record in the past five years—breaking and entering and a drug violation. His traffic record shows three tickets in the same space of time."

Neutral defendant. "Sander is employed in the area. He went to the office party in the insurance firm headquarters shortly after the party had begun. After the party Sander was heading in the direction of home. When the incident occurred, Sander was slightly shaken up by the impact, but suffered no major injuries. His traffic record shows he has received three traffic tickets in the past five years, two of which were moving violations."

The case accounts ended as follows: "Sander, who had stopped his car at the scene of the accident, was apprehended and charged with negligent automobile homicide, a crime which in the State is punishable by imprisonment of one to twenty-five years."

Following the description of the offense was a page of instructions requesting the subjects to judge and sentence the defendant. The subjects were requested to consider the crime of negligent automobile homicide as punishable for from 1 to 25 years imprisonment, and to sentence the defendant to a specific number of years of imprisonment, according to their *own personal judgment*. They were told to take as much time as they wanted in making their decision.

The last page of the case account booklets contained several additional questions pertaining to the subject's feeling about the guilt of the defendant, and his impressions of the defendant and the victim. Each of these questions was answered on a 9-point scale appropriately labeled at the end points.

Results and Discussion

In order to assess the effectiveness of the character descriptions of the defendant and the victim, we asked the subjects to indicate their impressions of the defendant and the victim on a 9-point scale on which "9"

meant "extremely negative (unfavorable)" and "1" meant "extremely positive (favorable)." The mean impression rating of the victim for the subjects in the Attractive Victim (AV) conditions was 2.52, while the mean impression rating of the victim for subjects in the Unattractive Victim (UV) conditions was 7.64. This difference was significant at beyond the .001 level of probability ($F = 354.21$, 1 and 111 *df*). The mean impression ratings of the defendant were as follows: For subjects in the Attractive Defendant (AD) conditions, 5.53; for subjects in the Neutral Defendant (ND) conditions, 6.04; and for subjects in the Unattractive Defendant (UD) conditions, 7.08. An analysis of variance performed on these data yielded $F = 8.11$ (2 and 111 *df*, $p < .001$). It is thus apparent that the character descriptions of the defendant and the victim had their intended effect.

The subjects were also requested to rate how guilty they felt the defendant was. We, of course, expected that there would be no differences in the subjects' guilt ratings of the defendant across experimental conditions and that the defendant would be perceived as having been definitely guilty of the crime. On a scale where "9" meant "definitely guilty of the crime," the subjects' guilt ratings of the defendant ranged from a mean of 8.00 (for subjects in the ND-UV condition) to a mean of 8.67 (for subjects in the AD-UV condition). The difference between these two extremes did not reach the conventional level of significance ($t = 1.47$, 39 *df*). The null hypothesis, of course, cannot be proved; nevertheless, the guilt rating data does afford some support regarding the subjects' uniform perception of the defendant's guilt.

With regard to the effect of the character description of the victim on the severity of sentence passed on the defendant, the results of Experiment II parallel those of Experiment I. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the sentences made by the subjects in each of the experimental conditions.

An examination of this table indicates that, as predicted, the average sentence made by subjects in the AV conditions, 10.55 years imprisonment, was greater than the average sentence made by the subjects in the UV conditions, 8.48 years imprisonment. An analysis of variance yields an F ratio of 2.79 for the main effect due to the character of the victim. This only reaches the .09 level of significance (1 and 111 *df*). While the data in both Experiments I and II lend directional support to the hypothesis concerning the relationship between the character of the victim and the severity of sentencing, in neither experiment does the magnitude of the obtained differences between the AV and UV conditions reach the conventional level of significance. We, therefore, transformed the sentences in the two experiments to standard scores ($M = 50$, $S =$

10) and performed an analysis on the combined standardized data. It will be recalled that while the basic case account and procedure was similar in both experiments, the range of possible sentences differed. In Experiment I it was from 1 to 60 years and in Experiment II it was from 1 to 25 years. The transformation to standard scores made the data of the two experiments comparable.

With the data of Experiments I and II combined, the mean standardized sentence of the 186 subjects in the AV condition was 51.42; the

TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE SENTENCES (EXPRESSED AS YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT) MADE BY SUBJECTS IN EACH OF THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS OF EXPERIMENT II

		Victim		
		Attractive	Unattractive	Total
Defendant Attractive	<i>M</i>	8.72	8.44	8.58
	<i>σ</i>	4.18	6.60	
	<i>N</i>	18.	18.	36.
Neutral	<i>M</i>	9.05	7.39	8.22
	<i>σ</i>	9.01	7.63	
	<i>N</i>	21.	23.	44.
Unattractive	<i>M</i>	13.89	9.61	11.75
	<i>σ</i>	5.76	5.98	
	<i>N</i>	18.	18.	36.
Total	<i>M</i>	10.55	8.48	
	<i>N</i>	57.	59.	

mean standardized sentence of the 191 subjects in the UV condition was 48.92. The analysis performed on the combined data showed this difference to be significant at beyond the .03 level of probability ($F = 5.09$, 1 and 374 *df*).

We now turn to the data concerning the influence of the defendant's character on the severity of sentences made by the subjects. The data indicate that subjects in the UD conditions were more severe in their sentences than subjects in either the ND or AD conditions, even though the crime committed was identical in all conditions. Again, looking at Table 1, we see that the mean sentence given to the defendant by subjects in the AD conditions was 8.58 years, the mean sentence given by subjects in the ND conditions was 8.22 years, and the mean sentence given by subjects in the UD conditions was 11.75 years. The analysis of

variance yielded a significant main effect due to the defendant's character factor ($F = 3.27$, 2 and 111 *df*, $p < .05$). While the mean sentence given by subjects in the ND conditions is slightly smaller than that given by subjects in the AD conditions, the difference does not approach statistical significance. The AD versus ND contrast produced a $t < 1$ (79 *df*). The contrast comparing the AD and ND versus the UD conditions is significant ($t = 2.51$, 115 *df*, $p < .05$, two-tailed test). There was no significant interaction between the defendant's and the victim's character factors ($F < 1$).

One reason that the subjects were more lenient on the neutral and attractive defendants is that subjects in the ND and AD conditions may have found it easier to identify with the defendant than could subjects in the UD condition. That is, the subjects may have found it easier to imagine themselves involved in a similar situation when the defendant was attractive or neutral simply because they had potentially more in common with the defendant in those conditions.

It may also be that subjects not only perceive the crime as being more serious when the victim is attractive as opposed to unattractive, but that they also view the defendant as being more unattractive when the victim is attractive. This latter possibility receives some support from the impression ratings of the defendant. When the victim was presented as being an attractive person, the subjects' impression of the defendant was significantly less favorable than when the victim was presented as an unattractive person. The mean impression rating of the defendant for subjects in the AV conditions was 6.53; for subjects in the UV conditions it was 5.9 ($F = 3.77$, 1 and 111 *df*, $p < .05$).

If this was simply the result of a contrast effect, i.e., a tendency to exaggerate the difference between the characters of the defendant and the victim, one would expect a similar difference in the impression ratings of the *victim* made by subjects in the AD and UD conditions. No such difference was manifest. For subjects in the AD conditions, the mean impression rating of the victim was 5.23; for subjects in the UD conditions it was 5.31.

Taken as a whole, our results suggest that both the character of the defendant and the character of the victim are important variables in the severity of the sentence imposed. While the results of these laboratory experiments may have important implications for actual jury trials, a direct and literal extrapolation would be imprudent. Regardless of how seriously our subjects took their task, the fact remains that college students sitting in a classroom are not identical to actual jurors sitting in judgment at a real trial. At the same time, we are encouraged by the fact that in the absence of extraneous stimuli, our results paralleled some

of the findings of Kalven and Zeisal (1966) in their examination of actual cases.

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Self-Depriving Behavior as a Response to Unprofitable Inequity¹

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Several theoretical assumptions suggest that a member of a dyad who is underrewarded will sometimes engage in self-depriving behavior, i.e., he will further decrease his share of reward. To test these assumptions, a subject and a confederate were rewarded for performing a task in which their work inputs were highly similar. Subjects given somewhat less than half the reward subsequently increased their share. Among subjects given much less than half the reward, however, many decreased their share. Questionnaire data suggest that self-depriving behavior is an instrumental response which reduces a threat to subjects' power.

The equity model (Adams, 1965) analyzes an exchange relationship between two individuals in terms of the proportionality of their perceived inputs and outcomes. As perceived by a given member of the dyad (Person), inputs are those behaviors and traits for which he or the other member (Other) should be rewarded. Outcomes are the rewards which Person believes are being received by himself or Other. When Person perceives his own outcomes or those of Other as being disproportionate to their respective inputs, Person will attempt to restore proportionality by altering his own inputs and outcomes or those of Other.

Leventhal, Allen, and Kemelgor (in press) have shown that when Person cannot modify his own inputs or those of Other, he is likely to reduce inequity by reallocating available rewards. They hypothesized that when inequity was profitable to Person, i.e., when his outcomes were too large relative to his work inputs, Person would decrease his share of outcomes. They also hypothesized that when inequity was unprofitable to Person, i.e., when his outcomes were too small relative to his work inputs, Person would increase his share of outcomes. Leventhal *et al.* (in press) had their subjects work with a confederate on a task in which the work

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