Living with Ideas #1

September 2, 2003

As I read about history and theories in educational psychology, I have handy context in which to mentally rehearse these ideas. I'm very interested in the use of computer games in schools. This interest is framed by my larger belief that schools should co-opt the technologies students already play with. Co-opting leverages students' pre-existing engagement for more meaningful learning. So issues of engagement and motivation, especially self-efficacy, attract my attention. Over the course of my career I hope to significantly shape a framework for understanding and applying best practices for creating and using games in schools.

My early scientific literacy and skills were strongly influenced by my work in physical science, especially chemistry. I also studied under an inspiring behaviorist, Allen Neuringer, himself a student of Skinner. Behaviorist frameworks are intuitive and useful to me, as a former classroom teacher and as a designer of games for teaching. It's relatively easy to use a framework of operant conditioning for making choices about an interface, a quest/reward system, or another aspect of game design. Thus, I'm intrigued by this week's reading, with its focus on behaviorism.

I read "Why I Am Not a Cognitive Psychologist" first, because of my existing admiration for Skinner, and because I expect LTC to challenge my nascent behaviorist thinking. As a physical scientist and a rhetorician, I find Skinner's focus on observable phenomena appealing. Like many behaviorists, I feign confusion when people describe sophisticated metaphors for invisible cognition. I'm not yet capable of appreciating the intricacies of Skinner's rebuttals to challenges to his framework. I believe Skinner is a very careful rhetorician, and is often made a straw man because he was parsimonious with his thinking and arguments. He might agree with some opinions, but they are only opinions without observation data. Skinner and I are both very wary of accepting any framework that lacks a firm foundation in observable behavior. I especially appreciate learning more about covert behaviors, since this is a valuable tool in my behaviorist's toolbox (and armor). There's a temptation to classify speaking or thinking as special behaviors, quite distinct from walking or other psychomotor behaviors. I'm reluctant to make that distinction too harshly. We don't like to consider ourselves controlled by our environment. Finally, Skinner's desire to improve society endears him to me, as I am more interested in the end (improved learning and a better society) than the means (a clever theoretical framework).

I next read Phillips and Soltis' chapter on behaviorism. I am familiar with most of the general ideas but I enjoyed the review and greater depth. I find their tone offensive, as when anyone characterizes behaviorists as quaint and archaic. They also have some sloppy ethnocentricity, which I noted because of my growing dislike for their tone. Behaviorists are characterized as believing the mind is simpler than it is. Rather, we believe that we're severely restricted in what we can prove about the mind. Overall, I find this piece skewed. "Oh, those behaviorists sure seemed clever, but thank goodness we've gotten so much smarter!" No doubt I have a persecution complex.

Finally I read Miller's chapter on "Social Learning Theory," starring one of my favorite characters: Bandura. Miller tries a little too hard to make this a progressive story, in which more complex frameworks are inherently superior. While such progression is appealing, it's not assured. I enjoy the vivid examples of experiments. (Psychologists were pretty zany until human subject ethics were recognized as critical.) I don't understand "hydraulic models." I like the mix of behaviorism and social psychology, since socialization and cultural dynamics are huge issues in game studies. For example, reciprocal determinism is very topical. "Physics envy" - ha! That's exactly the term I need to explain the effects of my physical science studies on my ed psych beliefs. It's fun to try restating some of the complex theories in behaviorist terms. What's a "decalage" and why was it necessary to use this wacky word? Vicarious learning is an important idea in game studies. So is hot cognition. From the discussion of logically-perfect domains (physics) and less-logical domains (friendship) I muse on a "fog of relationships" like a "fog of war." I need to explore that idea. I really enjoyed this piece, and may want to reread it several times over the years.